The most popular argument of the critics of the Iraq war has been that the United States went to war for oil — that is, that the war had nothing to do with combating terrorism. Writing in the Christian Science Monitor before the war, Brendan O’Neill reported that « for many in the antiwar movement, the idea that the Bushies’ plan to invade the Gulf to get their greasy hands on more oil has become an article of faith, an unquestionable truth repeated like a mantra. » [1] Among those believers is America’s preeminent left-wing war critic, Noam Chomsky: « Of course it was Iraq’s energy resources. It’s not even a question. Iraq’s one of the major oil producers in the world. It has the second largest reserves and it’s right in the heart of the Gulf’s oil-producing region, which U.S. intelligence predicts is going to be two thirds of world resources in coming years. » [2]

That goes against what I regard as the fundamental reason for the war: the war was led by neoconservatives and fought in the interests of Israel, at least as Likudniks envision Israel’s interests. It is all well-documented, though the neocons imply that Israeli interests coincide with those of the United States. But as I point out in my article on the subject — and this fact is on the public record, too — the original idea for the war was conceived in Israel. Moreover, the war achieved the goal hoped for by the Likudniks — destabilization of the Middle East.

Although the neoconservative/Israel theory is not without its adherents, a number of factors explain the much greater popularity of the war-for-oil idea among critics of the war. For critics on the Left, the idea fits in with their notion of rapacious capitalism. Perhaps more importantly, their emphasis on the monetary motives of oil companies placed the war in a simple, good-bad framework. « The well-rehearsed oil argument, » O’Neill observes, « attempts to make war a simple issue of good versus evil, with oil-greedy imperialists on one side and defenseless civilians on the other. » [3]

In other words, the idea that the war was fought to profit the oil companies, complete with the propagandistically effective « No blood for oil » sound bite, provided a perfect counterpole to the Bush administration’s presentation of an apocalyptic conflict of good versus evil. Even the neocon supporters of the war lent some credence to its validity with their talk about privatizing Iraqi oil.

Of course, that some oil companies might derive benefits from the U.S. takeover of Iraq does not mean they were the driving force. In short, the neoconservatives certainly sought allies for their war agenda, and the promise of oil riches was one way they saw of possibly drawing support from the oil companies.

An additional reason for the popularity of the war-for-oil argument is that any reference to Israel and the neoconservatives moves into the taboo area of Jewish power and invites the lethal charge of anti-Semitism. It is obviously far safer to demonize the oil industry than to make anything approaching a critical comment regarding individual Jews or Jewish interests, even if it is not a criticism of Jews as a group.
What precisely does the war-for-oil thesis entail? Two motives for such a war suggest themselves, and they are fundamentally different from each other: one is to benefit the American oil industry, and the other is to enhance the hegemonic power of the United States by giving it control of the oil spigot of the world.

Let’s begin by distinguishing between the oil argument and the current war profiteering. Undoubtedly, the reconstruction of Iraq is a veritable gold mine for some American firms, especially those with close connections to the Bush administration. In fact, the war-profiteering gravy train began while the war was still on. [4] Some of these firms, such as Halliburton, are in the oil-equipment business. And a significant part of the rebuilding naturally involves the oil infrastructure. Thus, the rebuilding of Iraq means profits for those in the oil-equipment business.

But that special sector is not the same thing as what is implied by « the oil industry » — i.e., those firms that actually profit by extracting and selling oil. Halliburton would benefit financially if all the pipelines and oil wells were blown up, so that it could rebuild them. Such a scenario would hardly profit oil producers or the U.S. government. It obviously wouldn’t increase the overall oil supply. Nor, certainly, would rebuilding the Iraqi oil industry profit the United States as a whole, since American taxpayers would be funding it. Undoubtedly, there are war profiteers in any war. But as a class they would have had no reason to press specifically for a war on Iraq.

Second, it should be acknowledged that the United States would have preferred to gain control of the Iraqi oil. The first locations that U.S. and U.K. forces secured during the war were the oilfields of southern Iraq, with the aim of preventing Saddam from destroying them. Clearly, any occupier would prefer to exploit rather than destroy a country’s assets. Keeping the Iraqi oil industry functioning would certainly alleviate the financial burden of American occupation and help fund Iraq’s postwar reconstruction. The United States also sought to prevent Saddam from setting fire to the oil wells and causing an environmental catastrophe, as he had done in Kuwait during the first Gulf War. Environmental considerations aside, such fires could have slowed American troop movements northward to Baghdad. [5] But while the United States would have naturally preferred oil over no oil, the American military’s concern for the security of the Iraqi oil wells did not in any way demonstrate that seizing oil resources was the motivation for America to launch its invasion.

It is undisputed that Iraq is an oil-rich country. And we may grant that the war party sought to gain support from the oil industry by promising benefits to be derived from that support. War partisans did the same thing when they tried to get international support by implying that countries that did not support the war would be shut out of the Iraqi oil business.
However, instead of speculating about the benefits to be derived by American oil companies from U.S. control of Iraq, it is much more reasonable to actually look at Big Oil’s position on the war. Did oil companies push for war? The fact is that representatives of the U.S. oil industry had been solid in opposing the embargo on Iraq, which had kept them out of that country. After George W. Bush assumed the presidency in 2001, they lobbied hard for a repeal of the Iran-Libya sanctions act and other embargoes that curbed their expansion of holdings in the Middle East. That put them at loggerheads with the neoconservatives, who for years had been calling for regime change in Iraq.

In a May 2001 Business Week article, Rose Brady reported that the easing of sanctions on rogue states « pits powerful interests such as the pro-Israeli lobby and the U.S. oil industry against each other. And it is sure to preoccupy the Bush Administration and Congress. » [6] Fareed Mohamedi of PFC Energy, a consulting firm based in Washington, D.C., that advises petroleum firms, asserted that the large oil companies had sought a more peaceful approach to securing their interests in the Gulf region and the Arab world: « Big oil told the Cheney Task Force on Energy Policy in 2001 that they wanted the U.S. sanctions lifted on Libya and Iran so they could gain access to their oil supplies. As far back as 1990, they were even arguing that the United States should cut a deal with Saddam because he had given signals he was willing to let U.S. oil companies into Iraq. » [7]

Oil-industry representatives did not even move toward a pro-war position in the post-September 11 period. According to oil analyst Anthony Sampson in December 2002, « Oil companies have had little influence on U.S. policy-making. Most big American companies, including oil companies, do not see a war as good for business, as falling share prices indicate. » [8]

Oil companies sought stability, and there was a widespread fear that war would bring on a regional conflagration. « War in the Persian Gulf might produce a major upheaval in petroleum markets, either because of physical damage or because political events lead oil producers to restrict production after the war, » wrote economist William D. Nordhaus, a member of President Jimmy Carter’s Council of Economic Advisers, in late 2002. « A particularly worrisome outcome would be a wholesale destruction of oil facilities in Iraq, and possibly in Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. In the first Persian Gulf War, Iraq destroyed much of Kuwait’s oil wells and other petroleum infrastructure as it withdrew. The sabotage shut down Kuwaiti oil production for close to a year, and prewar levels of oil production were not reached until 1993 — nearly two years after the end of the war in February 1991. » [9]
It was never a realistic possibility that the oil would somehow pay for the costs of the war and benefit the U.S. economy, though that notion was sometimes bandied about in the media. Obviously, far from providing cheap oil for the United States, the war and the occupation of Iraq have proved a serious economic drain. And the difficulties with the occupation were anticipated before the war started. In fact, a yearlong pre-war State Department study, beginning in February 2002, foresaw the chaotic conditions that would exist during an American occupation of Iraq. [10] The CIA also warned the Bush administration of extensive post-war resistance. [11]

Two classified reports prepared for President Bush in January 2003 by the National Intelligence Council, an independent group that advises the director of the CIA, predicted that an American-led invasion of Iraq would increase support for the radical Islamicists and result in a deeply divided Iraqi society prone to violent internal conflict. One of the reports also warned of a possible insurgency against the new Iraqi government or American-led forces by rogue elements from Saddam Hussein’s government and existing terrorist groups. In addition, the assessments held that an American attack on Iraq would increase sympathy across the Islamic world for terrorist objectives. Such developments would be hardly be conducive to the stability needed for oil production. [12]

Even more significant was an exhaustive pre-war report conducted in the fall of 2002 by the U.S. Defense Department’s Energy Infrastructure Planning Group pointing out that an oil bonanza should not be expected, because of the dilapidated condition of the Iraqi oil infrastructure. After years of decay, that infrastructure would require years of work and billions of dollars in investment before it could provide plentiful oil. [13]

Furthermore, Amy Myers Jaffe, an oil expert who had frequently served as a government consultant, headed an energy group at the James Baker III Policy Institute at Rice University that concluded in 2002 that Iraq oil revenues would not be sufficient to cover reconstruction. [14]

« As a business decision, » said Charles A. Kohlhaas, a former professor of petroleum engineering at the Colorado School of Mines and a longtime oil man, « invading Iraq ‘for the oil’ is a loser, a big loser. Anyone who would propose, in a corporate boardroom, invading Iraq for the oil would probably find his career rather short. No, the slogan ‘no war for oil’ is a blatant misrepresentation propagated for political reasons. » [15]
The other argument involving oil relates not so much to economic gain for the United States or to the interests of Big Oil, but rather to increased power for the United States in world affairs. As one commentator wrote: « Oil appears in Washington’s calculations about Iraq as a strategic rather than an economic resource: the war against Saddam is about guaranteeing American hegemony rather than about increasing the profits of Exxon. » [16] It was argued that American control of Iraq’s oil would give the United States great leverage over Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing nations in the Middle East in setting production levels. Leveraging the oil supplies of Iraq and the Middle East would enable the United States to exercise control over the world, since the industrial nations depend on oil for survival. « Controlling Iraq is about oil as power, rather than oil as fuel, » maintains Michael Klare, author of Resource Wars. « Control over the Persian Gulf translates into control over Europe, Japan, and China. It’s having our hand on the spigot. » [17]

Control of Iraqi oil for American global strategic interests would be a long-term plan and would presuppose a permanent American occupation, making the American-controlled Iraq resemble the World War II-era Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo or Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. But even those examples may not sufficiently describe the case. In terms of the model of 1940s France, Washington would need not a Vichy Iraq but an Occupied Iraq; not a Marshal Pétain as a client ruler, but a Gen. Stülpnagel as a proconsul. No lesser control would suffice, since there could be no guarantee that even a friendly semi-independent Iraqi government would pursue an oil policy that would sacrifice its own economic interests for American global strategy. Such an extended occupation would require extensive planning and involve colossal expense. There is no evidence that the Bush administration ever considered the requisite long-term occupation, much less planned for it.

Certainly, such an army of occupation was the polar opposite of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s design of a sleek, high-tech military, which would be efficient in defeating Saddam’s military but would not be well-suited to control the country. In fact, the existing costly occupation had already started to have a negative impact on Rumsfeld’s vision of the American military. Military analyst Loren Thompson pointed out that the cost of keeping U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan would almost certainly damage other Pentagon initiatives. « If the current level of expenditure in Iraq continues, » he said, « Donald Rumsfeld is going to have to kiss much of the technology part of his transformation plan goodbye. » [18]

The claim that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was predicated on the need to advance American global power is also undercut by the fact that few foreign-policy experts outside the neoconservative orbit saw the war policy as advancing that goal. If American global power were the goal, it is hard to understand why it was primarily neoconservatives who decided that a war on Iraq would achieve it.

Significantly, those cool to the pre-emptive strike on Iraq included luminaries of the Republican foreign-policy establishment such as Brent Scowcroft, who served as national security adviser under Presidents Ford and George H.W. Bush; Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who served as deputy secretary of state and secretary of state under the first Bush; and James A. Baker III, who preceded Eagleburger as the first Bush’s secretary of state. [19]

In an op-ed piece in the August 15, 2002, issue of the Wall Street Journal titled « Don’t Attack Iraq, » Scowcroft contended that Saddam was not connected with terrorists and that his weapons posed no threat to the United States. Scowcroft acknowledged that « given Saddam’s aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. » However: « An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken. » [20]

It should be noted that Scowcroft has been very close to George H.W. Bush, who was said to be privately very much against the war. President Bush implicitly acknowledged his father’s opposition when Bob Woodward asked him in an interview whether he had consulted his father on his decision to go to war. « He is the wrong father to appeal to for advice. The wrong father to go to, to appeal to in terms of strength, » Bush said. « There’s a higher Father that I appeal to. » [21]

Also expressing strong opposition to the war on Iraq was Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser in the Carter administration, who is often wrongly identified by hard-line war critics as the central figure in the war cabal. [22] To be sure, Brzezinski explicitly advocated American global dominance in his 1997 work, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. [23] However, during the buildup for war, he expressed the concern that a unilateral attack on Iraq would undermine America’s global interests. What especially troubled him was the havoc America’s unilateral march to war was wreaking on America’s alliance with Western Europe, which he considered the central element of American global policy, terming it the « anchor point of America’s engagement in world. » Brzezinski feared that the « cross-Atlantic vitriol » over the American plan to attack Iraq despite European opposition had left « NATO’s unity in real jeopardy. »

Moreover, the Bush administration’s fixation on Iraq interfered with America’s ability to engage in other global hot spots. Brzezinski observed that « there is justifiable concern that the preoccupation with Iraq — which does not pose an imminent threat to global security — obscures the need to deal with the more serious and genuinely imminent threat posed by North Korea. » Brzezinski granted that « force may have to be used to enforce the goal of disarmament. But how and when that force is applied should be part of a larger strategy, sensitive to the risk that the termination of Saddam Hussein’s regime may be purchased at too high a cost to America’s global leadership. » [24]
Intriguing, too, is the fact that the war was opposed by international-relations academicians of the « realist » school, consisting of those who emphasize power and national interest in world affairs. One would think that they might be apt to support such an endeavor if it actually promised to augment American power. Leading anti-Iraq war realists in academe included John Meirsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, Alexander George, Robert Jervis, Thomas Schelling, and Stephen Walt. They were among 33 academicians who took out an ad in the September 26, 2002, New York Times titled « War with Iraq Is Not in America’s National Interest. » Many signatories to that letter would form the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy in 2003. [25]

In fact, the entire foreign-policy establishment tended to be cool to the war policy, as shown by opposition from within the elite Council on Foreign Relations. As columnist Robert Kuttner wrote in September 2003: « It’s still a well-kept secret that the vast foreign-policy mainstream — Republican and Democratic ex-public officials, former ambassadors, military and intelligence people, academic experts — consider Bush’s whole approach a disaster. » [26]

American military experts also were opposed to a U.S. attack on Iraq. Even members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially expressed their opposition to the war. [27] Remarkably, opposition also came from three retired chiefs of the U.S. Central Command, which includes the Gulf region: Marine General Anthony Zinni, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, and Marine General Joseph P. Hoar. [28] Other prominent retired military figures who opposed the war included Colonel Mike Turner, a former policy planner for the Joint Chiefs on the Mideast and East Africa; Marine Colonel Larry Williams; former Navy secretary James Webb; and the most-decorated soldier of the Vietnam war era, Colonel David Hackworth. All opposed the Iraq war on the grounds that an American occupation of that country would be a disaster. [29]

More remarkably still, the Army War College, in a report made public in January 2004, « broadly criticizes the Bush administration’s handling of the war on terrorism, accusing it of taking a detour into an ‘unnecessary’ war in Iraq and pursuing an ‘unrealistic’ quest against terrorism that may lead to U.S. wars with states that pose no serious threat. » [30] That such a report should come out under the auspices of the Army War College signals deep disenchantment in the military with the war on Iraq.

***

Various converging pieces of evidence militate against the idea that the United States went to war to achieve global domination — a domination that was neither enhanced by the war nor, apparently, planned for. Moreover, the military and the experts closely connected to oil foreign policy, who were not neoconservatives, did not see the benefits to be derived from the war. If American global-power motives really predominated, it is hard to understand why support for the war was not more widespread, but instead was concentrated among neoconservatives. How could neocons see the advantages to be gained for American global power when they were invisible to most of the foreign-policy/national-security elite? As for the oil-profits motive, why would neocons be more interested in those purported profits than Big Oil itself?

We must recognize that the arguments regarding oil and American global power require far more speculation than the neconservative/Likudnik argument. The former arguments deny that terrorism had anything to do with the war, alleging that it was instead predicated on the desire for profit or global power, while the neocon/Likudnik argument assumes that fighting terrorism was the goal — and that fighting terrorism consisted of eliminating Middle East regimes hostile to Israel, which are de facto deemed terrorist. Neoconservatives openly advocated the elimination of these regimes, which included Iraq. Furthermore, neoconservatives explicitly admit that they want to advance Israel’s security.

There is no evidence that any group, other than the neoconservatives, had so marked Iraq for attack; the oil interest and the foreign-policy establishment certainly had not. No conspiracy was necessary; rather, the neocons openly advocated such a policy, as did Ariel Sharon’s government, and it was in line with long-held Likudnik thinking. Sharon’s government not only supported the war but also helped to facilitate it through bogus intelligence.

In surveying the results of the war, we see that there has been no great oil bonanza or expansion of U.S. global power. To the contrary, bogging down in Iraq would seem to make it more difficult for Washington to pursue other global goals. And instead of monopolizing control of Iraq, the United States is now begging for international help to militarily occupy Iraq. In short, those who emphasize the other motives for war must admit that the goals sought were not accomplished. In contrast, the neocon/Likudnik goal of enhancing Israeli security, as the Likudniks perceive it, has been accomplished. Justin Raimondo hits the mark when he writes: « This theme — that an Israeli-centric foreign policy is the real reason for this war — was not looked on with favor when the shooting began. But a year later, by a simple process of elimination, it is the only rational explanation left standing. » [31]
Does this mean that the neocons were simply agents of Likudnik Israel, hijacking American foreign policy in the interest of another country? Raimondo sometimes writes, perhaps hyperbolically, that this is the case. For example: « Strip away the ideological pretenses, the sexed-up ‘intelligence,’ and the ‘patriotic’ window-dressing, and what you see is the naked reality of Israel’s fifth column in America. » [32] Being unable to look into the neoconservatives’ minds, we need not endorse that harsh judgement. Suffice it to say that the neocons view American foreign policy through the lens of Israel’s interests (as Likudniks perceive Israel’s interest). Quite likely they truly view Israel’s interests as America’s interests. It is unlikely that they actually see themselves as sacrificing the United States for the benefit of Israel. Self-deception is not uncommon in ideologically driven individuals.

The idea that some Americans might be motivated by an attachment to a foreign country and that they could be influential in determining American foreign policy is not such an outlandish, unheard-of idea. Historians and other commentators have frequently proposed that German-Americans, Cuban-Americans, Polish-Americans, and other ethnic groups have been influenced in their foreign-policy views by their attachment to a foreign country. Historians have argued that Woodrow Wilson’s support for England in World War I resulted in part from his pro-English bias.

Going back to the beginning of the Republic, we recall that Alexander Hamilton tended to be pro-British and Thomas Jefferson pro-French. That some Americans could have a « passionate attachment » to a foreign state and thereby sacrifice American interests for the sake of that state was a cardinal warning in George Washington’s famous Farewell Address of 1796. [33] If Israel and Jews were not involved, there would be nothing extraordinary about this thesis; but since they are, the subject is in the realm of the taboo.

Finally, the evidence for the neoconservative and Likudnik positions on war in the Middle East is all out in the open. It is published. There is no dark, hidden conspiracy. But in the realm of politics, as George Orwell observed, « To see what is in front of one’s nose needs a constant struggle. » [34]

NOTES

1. Brendan O’Neill, « Being antiwar isn’t about the oil, »Christian Science Monitor, January 23, 2003.

2. Noam Chomsky, interview with Dubai TV, « ‘Of course, it was all about Iraq’s resources,' » December 2, 2003.

3. O’Neill.

4. Pratap Chatterjee, « Halliburton Makes a Killing on Iraq War, » Corpwatch, March 20, 2003.

5. Sam Howe Verhovek and John Hendren, « U.S. Seeking to Protect Iraqi Oil Fields, » Los Angeles Times, March 20, 2003; and Bill Glauber, « Oil field sabotage called halfhearted, » Chicago Tribune, April 6, 2003.

6. Rose Brady, ed., « Rogue States: Why Washington May Ease Sanctions, » Business Week, May 7, 2001.

7. Roger Burbach, « Bush Ideologues Trump Big Oil Interests in Iraq, » Alternatives, September 30, 2003.

8. Anthony Sampson, « Oilmen don’t want another Suez, » Guardian Unlimited, December 22, 2002. Sampson is author of The Seven Sisters (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), which deals with oil companies and the Middle East.

Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway wrote in The Washington Post: « Officials of several major firms said they were taking care to avoiding playing any role in the debate in Washington over how to proceed on Iraq. ‘There’s no real upside for American oil companies to take a very aggressive stance at this stage. There’ll be plenty of time in the future,’ said James Lucier, an oil analyst with Prudential Securities. » (« In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil Is Key Issue, » September 15, 20002, p. A1)

For MSNBC, John W. Schoen wrote: « So far, U.S. oil companies have been mum on the subject of the potential spoils of war. » (« Iraqi oil, American bonanza?, » November 11, 2002) See also Dana Goldstein, « Iraq war not about oil, says industry insider, » Brown Daily Herald, February 28, 2003.

9. William D. Nordhaus, « Iraq: The Economic Consequences of War, » New York Review of Books, December 5, 2002. See also George L. Perry, « The War on Terrorism, the World Oil Market and the U.S. Economy » (pdf), Analysis Paper #7, America’s Response to Terrorism, November 28, 2001 (rev.).

10. Eric Schmitt and Joel Brinkley, « State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq, » New York Times, October 19, 2003. [Please note: This reposting, by Truthout.org, may constitute a copyright violation.]

11. Bryan Bender, « CIA Warned Bush of Iraq War Guerrilla Peril, » Boston Globe, August 9, 2003. [Please note: This reposting, by GlobalSecurity.com, may constitute a copyright violation.]

12. Douglas Jehl and David E. Sanger, « Prewar Assessment on Iraq Saw Chance of Strong Divisions, » New York Times, September 28, 2004.

13. Rupert Cornwell, « Pentagon officials ignored reports on dire state of Iraq’s oil industry, » Independent, October 6, 2003. [Please note: This reposting, by Rense.com, may constitute a copyright violation.]

Jeff Gerth, « Report Offered Bleak Outlook about Iraq Oil, » New York Times, October 5, 2003. [Please note: This reposting, by Common Dreams, may constitute a copyright violation.]

14. Gerth; and Stefan Halfer and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 223.

15. Charles A. Kaulhaus, « War in Iraq: ‘Not a War for Oil,' » In the National Interest, March 5, 2003.

16. Yahya Sadowski, « No war for whose oil?, » Le Monde diplomatique, April 2003.

17. Quoted in Robert Dreyfus, « The Thirty-Year Itch, » MotherJones.com, March/April 2003.

18. Dave Moniz, « Monthly Costs of Iraq, Afghan Wars Approach That of Vietnam, » USA Today, September 8, 2003, p. 1.

19. « GOP Backing Out of Iraq Offensive?, » FOXNews.com, August 16, 2002.

Todd S. Purdum and Patrick E. Tyler, « Top Republicans Break with Bush on Iraq Strategy, » New York Times, August 16, 2002. [Please note: This reposting, by Common Dreams, may constitute a copyright violation.]

Jim Lobe, « Washington goes to war over war, » Asia Times, August 21, 2002.

Lawrence Eagleburger seved in foreign-policy and national-security positions for Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, and had been a protégé of Henry Kissinger’s. On Eagleburger, see « Lawrence Eagleburger, » Harry Walker Agency.

Brent Scowcroft served as national-security adviser to both Presidents Ford and George H.W. Bush. From 1982 to 1989, he was vice chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm. A West Point graduate, Scowcroft served 29 years in the military, attaining the rank of lieutenant general.

20. Brent Scowcroft, « Don’t Attack Iraq, » Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002. (Posted, perhaps by permission, at The Forum for International Policy.)

21. « Woodward Shares War Secrets, » « 60 Minutes, » CBS News, April 19, 2004.

22. Michele Steinberg, « Can the Brzezinski-Wolfowitz Cabal’s War Game Be Stopped?, » Executive Intelligence Review, December 7, 2001.

23. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). A similar argument that the control of vital resources is the key to global power and global warfare is presented by Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt, 2001).

24. Zbigniew Brzezinski, « Why Unity Is Essential, » Washington Post, February 19, 2003. (Posted, perhaps by permission, at drumbeat.mlaterz.net.)

25. « War With Iraq Is Not in America’s National Interest, » New York Times, September 26, 2002. (Ad text, apparently not copyrighted, posted at bear-left.com.)

Daniel W. Drezner, « The realist take on Iraq, » Daniel W. Drezner Website, September 25, 2002.

« About the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, » Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, December 29, 2003.

26. Robert Kuttner, « Neo-cons have hijacked U.S. foreign policy, » Boston Globe, September 10, 2003.

27. Thomas E. Ricks, « Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in Iraq, » Washington Post, July 28, 2002, p. A-1; Justin Raimondo, « Attack of the Chicken-Hawks »; and Doug Thompson, « Suddenly, the hawks are doves and the doves are hawks, » Capitol Hill Blue, August 1, 2002.

28. Mike Salinero, « Gen. Zinni Says War with Iraq Is Unwise, » Tampa Tribune, 24 August 2002. [Please note: This reposting, at what appears to be a personal home page at www.mtholyoke.edu, may constitute a copyright violation.]

« Joseph Hoar, » Disinfopedia; « Norman Schwarzkopf, » Disinfopedia; and Thomas E. Ricks, « Desert Caution, » Washington Post, January 28, 2003, p.  C1.

29. « Commentary: Possible Worst-Case Scenarios If War with Iraq Occurs, » National Public Radio, March 11, 2003.

James Webb, « Do we really want to occupy Iraq for the next 30 years?, » Washington Post, September 4, 2002. [Please note: This reposting, at Soldiers for the Truth, may constitute a copyright violation.]

David Hackworth, « First base, first!, » WorldNetDaily, November 26, 2002.

William Raspberry, « Unasked Questions, » Washington Post, September 30, 2002, p. A19. [Please note: This reposting, at what appears to be a personal home page at www.geocities.com, may constitute a copyright violation.]

30. Thomas E. Ricks, « Army War College report blasts war on terrorism, » © Knight Ridder, January 12, 2004. [Please note: This reposting at Information Clearinghouse from a version posted at Contra Costa Times may constitute a copyright violation.]

31. Justin Raimondo, « The Neocons’ War, » Antiwar.com, June 2, 2004.

32. Raimondo.

33. As he prepared to leave the presidency, George Washington wrote in his Farewell Address: « So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions; by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld. And it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding, with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation. » (« Washington’s Farewell Address 1796, » The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.)

34. George Orwell, « In Front of Your Nose, » Tribune, March 22, 1946. (Posted, in English, at a Russian Website devoted to the work of Orwell.)

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Ex-Mideast Envoy Zinni Charges Neocons Pushed Iraq War To Benefit Israel

Lowey: Bush’s Policies Increasing Danger to Jews Around the World

The simmering debate over the role of Jewish neoconservatives in drawing America into war in Iraq erupted with new fury this week. One of America’s most respected ex-generals took to the airwaves to charge on CBS News’ “60 Minutes” that the war had been fought for Israel’s benefit, just days after a similar charge was leveled on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

The retired general, Anthony Zinni, a past chief of the U.S. Central Command and President Bush’s former Middle East special envoy, told “60 Minutes” on Sunday that the neoconservatives’ role in pushing the war for Israel’s benefit was “the worst-kept secret in Washington.” Three days earlier, Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings, a South Carolina Democrat, rose on the Senate floor to defend a newspaper essay he had written earlier in the month making the same charge. Both men complained that they had been unfairly labeled antisemitic for speaking out.

Their comments come just weeks after the United Nations’ special envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, called Israel a “poison in the region” and said that American support for Israeli policies was making his job more difficult.

In the face of these mounting criticisms, a leading Jewish Democrat on Capitol Hill, Rep. Nita Lowey of New York, told the Forward that the president’s policies were increasing the danger to Jews across the world.

“We are very worried about the rise of antisemitism internationally,” said Lowey in an interview Monday with the Forward. She argued that disdain for the president and his policies has “stirred up” antisemitic feelings worldwide. “It’s a real concern for me as a Jewish member of Congress.”

Lowey’s comments drew sharp criticisms from officials at the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Congress. “That’s absurd,” said the ADL’s national director, Abraham Foxman, when informed of Lowey’s comments. “It’s worse than blaming the victim. It’s blaming someone who stands up for the victim.” David Twersky, the director of international programs at the American Jewish Congress, also objected, telling the Forward: “Without being partisan about it, I am appalled that anyone should attribute the rise of antisemitism in the Islamic world, and separately in Western Europe, to George Bush’s policies in the Middle East.”

One Democratic activist, who asked not to be identified, defended Lowey’s comments: “There is certainly a strong stream within the party, and particularly among progressives — and many Jews are progressives — that George Bush’s inability to play well with others and his inability to think diplomatically and multinationally … has increased world hatred of the United States. There are many in the Arab world who believe that America is run by and owned by Jews. So it is not that hard to get from A to B. I tend to think that any independent analyst would tend to say the same thing. So why try to give [Bush] the benefit of the doubt? If he could connect these dots it would modify his behavior and make him think more diplomatically.”

The Bush administration also was portrayed as reckless by Gen. Anthony Zinni during his interview with “60 Minutes,” in which he said it “was the worst-kept secret in Washington” that neoconservatives had sold Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on a plan to democratize the Middle East. Those remarks drew criticisms from officials at both the National Jewish Democratic Council and the Republican Jewish Coalition.

Just three days before Zinni’s interview was broadcast, Hollings took to the Senate floor to defend his little-noticed claim earlier this month that Bush sent the country to war in order to win Jewish votes and protect Israel, after consulting with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith and Richard Perle, the former chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board. In his May 20 floor speech, Hollings also blasted the policies of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the influence of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the lobbying powerhouse in Washington known as Aipac.

“You can’t have an Israel policy other than what Aipac gives you around here,” Hollings said. “I have followed them mostly in the main, but I have also resisted signing certain letters from time to time, to give the poor president a chance.”

Hollings said he was motivated by a concern for Israel, which he insisted has been threatened by the turmoil in Iraq. But the South Carolina senator drew sharp criticism from Jewish communal leaders, Jewish political activists from both parties, and Democratic and Republican lawmakers, including Senator John Kerry (Please see story on Page 4).

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Foxman sent Hollings a letter May 14 arguing that the senator’s remarks were “reminiscent of age-old, antisemitic canards about a Jewish conspiracy to control and manipulate the government.”

During his floor speech, Hollings spoke angrily about critics who raised such claims. “I won’t apologize,” Hollings declared during a May 20 speech from the Senate floor. “I want them to apologize to me.”

Zinni sounded a similar note in his “60 Minutes” interview, complaining that he was “called antisemitic” for writing an article in which he mentioned Bush’s neoconservative advisers.

“I mean, you know, unbelievable that that’s the kind of personal attacks that are run when you criticize a strategy and those who propose it,” Zinni said. “I certainly didn’t criticize who they were. I certainly don’t know what their ethnic religious backgrounds are. And I’m not interested.”